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SUM M ARY
I. SIGNIFICANCE OF CREDIT PROBLEM
It is estimated that the farmers’ elevators of Iowa handled 
$25,000,000 of supplies at retail in 1927-28, at least 50 percent 
of which was sold on credit. The amount of receivables carried 
on the books per company was $11,240. On this basis, the 
amount carried by 500 companies would be $5,620,000.
Receivables represent about one-fourth of the annual side­
line sales. They ranged from 2 to 95 percent of annual retail 
sales. The percentage was between 10 and 30 for over half 
the companies.
Sideline sales were 24 percent of the total sales. Yet, the 
receivables absorbed 21 percent of total capital, 73 percent of 
share capital and over 90 percent of working capital. On the 
average, 98 cents was borrowed for each dollar of receivables.
Credit costs averaged $1,943 a year per company. Of this 
total, $695 was interest, $686 were for bad debts, and $562 
were bookkeeping, collecting and office costs.
The above credit cost was 40 percent of the gross profit 
realized on sidelines, 21.7 percent of total expenses and 9.1 
percent of the share capital. The average credit cost was $7.84 
a year for each $100 of credit sales, and $17.29 for each $100 of 
receivables carried.
II. DOES IT PAY TO SELL ON CREDIT?
Credit costs absorbed 79 percent of gross profits on credit 
sales; The credit policy largely determines the profits from 
sidelines. Credit costs were 0.8 percent of sideline sales for 
the strict credit companies, and 9.89 percent for the most 
liberal credit group.
sales alone were to bear the costs of carrying credit, 
additions to margins necessary to cover credit costs must be 
*•51 percent of credit sales for strict companies, and 12.04 for 
liberal companies.
On the average, credit sales are unprofitable when receiv­
ables exceed 15 percent of total annual sideline sales.
No evidence of indirect benefits of extending credit liberally 
were revealed in costs of operation, financial ratios, volume of 
business, or adequacy of capital. The financial condition of 
¡liberal companies was less favorable than that of strict com­
panies. ; Strict companies borrowed 7.2 percent, and liberal 
companies almost one-fourth, of their total capital require­
ments.
[topics^6 Table of Contents for page references to detailed discussion of specific
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III. COST TO PATRONS OF RETAIL CREDIT
Credit at elevators costs the average patron of a strict com­
pany 7 percent per year. It costs a patron of a liberal company 
12 percent. About two-thirds of the credit costs, however, are 
not paid by credit patrons, but are passed on to the cash and 
grain patrons. Gross discrimination between cash and credit 
patrons results where discounts for cash payment are not 
granted.
IV. CONTROLLING THE CREDIT PROBLEM
Attempts to curtail credit extensions were being made by 18 
percent of the companies. About one-third limited the time 
to 30 days or less. About one-fourth allowed cash discounts, 
and 42 percent attempted to charge interest on accounts.
One-tenth of the companies kept receivables below 10 per­
cent of annual sales, and one-fourth had receivables amounting 
to less than 15 percent of annual sales.
About 85 percent of the companies favored restricting credit 
extensions, and most of the other 15 percent were on a cash 
or ‘ ‘ nearly”  cash basis.
Experience proves that a farmers’ elevator can operate suc­
cessfully on a restricted credit or cash basis. Nine companies 
doing business on an almost strictly cash basis had average 
sales of $64,333; 15 liberal companies had average sales of
$26,13a
Managers report that strict limitations of credit eliminate 
discrimination, attract business of cash patrons, reduce costs 
of operation, help meet competition and avoid loss of grain 
patronage of credit supply patrons. A study of 30 farmers’ ele­
vators which have changed from liberal to strict credit terms 
shows that the change can usually be made with little if any 
difficulty. Many benefits were reported as a result of re­
stricting credit.
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Retail Credit in Iowa Farmers’ 
Elevators
B y  F r a n k  R o b o tk a*
PURPOSE AND METHOD OF STUDY
One purpose of this study is to determine the magnitude of 
the retail credit problem among Iowa farmers’ elevators, and 
the effect of different credit policies on volume of business, on 
the financial results of handling sidelines, and on the general 
financial prosperity of the elevators. Another purpose is to 
ascertain the methods used and the experiences and results of 
companies which have succeeded in eliminating credit selling 
or restricting it to the minimum.
This study is based on data obtained from a number of 
sources. Brief schedules covering general aspects of the prob­
lem were obtained by mail. Detailed reports were obtained 
personally from 50 companies, most of which were reported to 
be operating on either a cash basis or a restricted credit basis. 
Much of the statistical analysis is based on a random sample 
of 93 audited financial statements of companies well distri­
buted over the state. The statements cover fiscal years ending 
late in 1927 or early in 1928. Data were also obtained from re­
ports of discussions of the problem at 88 county and district 
meetings of farmers’ elevator managers and officers.
The general plan of the study is two-fold: (a) To make a 
qualitative analysis based on reports of meetings and especial­
ly on case studies in which an intensive study of conditions, 
experiences and results was made ; (b) to supplement the in­
formation obtained under (a) and to subject it to objective, 
quantitatiye tests based on data from many companies, not 
only to check the results, but to determine the extent of their 
general applicability.
That selling supplies “ on account”  is a serious problem 
among Iowa farmers’ elevators and is retarding their finan­
cial progress is generally conceded by the officers and man­
agers of farmers’ elevator companies. Retail credit was repor­
ed to be a problem in 80 out of 106 companies replying to a
*R. C. Bentley and George A. Arnold rendered valuable assistance 
in gathering the material for this study. The willing cooperation of 
numerous managers and officers of farmers’ elevators in contributing 
information and experiences, and of the Farmers’ Grain Dealers Asso­
ciation of Iowa in making accessible data in its files, is acknowledged 
with appreciation. Especially helpful suggestions and criticisms were 
received from Dr. A. G. Black, chief, and Prof. Paul L. Miller, assistant 
chief, of the Agricultural Economics Section.
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question regarding this point. Eleven of the other 26 compan­
ies operated either on a so-called cash basis or on some form of 
restricted or controlled credit plan.
Usually the management measures the seriousness of the 
credit problem in terms of the amount of receivables carried 
on the books, or the amount of bad accounts charged off, or in 
terms of the amount of money borrowed, especially when bor­
rowed on the personal security of directors.
Altho the management may be impressed by the credit prob­
lem in terms of the above considerations, its real significance 
lies in the managerial problems it raises, and these permeate 
the entire business structure. These ramifications are revealed 
only when the receivables and the costs of rendering credit 
service are seen in their relation to other financial and operat­
ing factors in the business, and when credit selling is studied 
from the point of view of its effects on the financial results of 
operations and the general prosperity of the business as a whole. 
Parts I and II are devoted to this sort of analysis.
PART I. SIG N IFICAN CE OF TH E CREDIT PROBLEM  
AMOUNT OF RECEIVABLES CARRIED
Regardless of the amount of receivables carried on the books, 
it is usually considered too large. ,On the basis of an analysis 
of reports from 93 companies, the receivables, including notes 
and accounts receivable ranged from’ $700 to over $40,000. 
One company not included in the analysis is known to have 
carried over $60,000. The average amount carried by the 93 
companies was $11,240. Seventy percent of the companies 
carried from $3,000 to $15,000, the largest number carrying 
from $5,000 to $10,000.
The distribution of the 93 companies, according to the amount 
carried, is shown in table I.
TABLE I. DISTRIBUTION OF 93 FARMERS’ ELEVATORS ACCORDING TO THE 
AMOUNT OF NOTES AND ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE CARRIED ON THE BOOKS
Amount Number of elevators Percent of elevators
Less than $3,000 7 7.5
$3,000 to $4,'999 14 15.1
$5,000 to $9,999 29 31.2
$10,000 to $14,999 22 23.6
$15,000 to $19,999 9 9.7
$20,000 to $24,999 5 5.4
$25,000 to $29,999 3 3.2
$30,000 or over 4 4.3
Total 93 100.0
Highest amount, $42,700; Lowest, $700; Average, $11,240.
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RELATION BETWEEN SALES AND RECEIVABLES
One factor affecting the amount of receivables is the volume 
of sideline sales, as shown in table II.
TABLE II. RELATION BETWEEN VOLUME OF SIDELINE SALES AND 
RECEIVABLES









No. of months 
sales represented 
by receivables
Less than $20,000 16 $ 14,300 $ 4,400 30.8 3.7
$20,000 -  $39,999 27 30,100 10,200 34.0 4.1
$40,000 -  $59,999 24 50,400 10,300 20.4 2.5
$60,000 -  $79,999 11 71,100 11,330 15.9 1.9
$80,000—and over 15 107,000 20,600 19.2 2.3
Weighted average 93 48,731 11,240 23.0 2.8
Receivables, however, do not increase as fast as volume of 
sales. Whereas, for the small volume companies receivables 
were about one-third of the sideline sales, they were less than 
one-fifth of the sales for the large volume companies. Receiv­
ables for the small volume companies represented about four 
months’ sales as compared with about two months’ sales for 
the large companies.
Large volume companies apparently restrict credit exten­
sions more than small volume companies.
Table III shows that over one-third of the companies had 
receivables equal to a third or more of their annual sales, and
TABLE JII. DISTRIBUTION OF 93 ELEVATORS ACCORDING TO THE PERCENT­
AGE THAT RECEIVABLES ARE OF SIDELINE SALES
Receivables—percent of 
sideline sales
Number of elevators Percent of elevators
Less than 10 9 9.7
10 to 19 24 25.8
20 to 29 28 30.1
30 to 39 17 18.3
40 and over 15 16.1
Total 93 100.0
Highest, 95 percent; lowest, 2.1 percent; simple average, 26.4 percent
15 companies had receivables equal to 40 percent of sales or 
Hiore, the highest being 95 percent, or 11.4 months’ sales. The 
high percentages strongly suggest that doubtful accounts are 
accumulating, or that receivables are increasing in the face . 
of falling sales.
It is significant, however, that 35 percent of the companies 
kept the receivables below a fifth of their sales. In fact, almost 
10 percent of the companies kept them below 10 percent of 
sales, the lowest being 2.1 percent, or approximately one-fourth
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of a month’s sales. None of the companies included in this 
study operated on a strictly cash basis, altho several approached 
this basis very closely.
Many companies reported that the amount of credit carried 
is increasing. Some increase is apparent in areas experiencing 
short grain crops, because of hail or drouth, and in individual 
cases owing to a lax credit policy. In other cases receivables 
were reported to be increasing because of adding sidelines, 
necessitated by reductions in volume of grain handled. In 
other cases demands for credit have increased as a result of 
the general depression in agriculture. An Ohio study1 based 
on 71 farmers’ elevators shows an increase of 53 percent in 
accounts receivable for a four-year period ending in 1928, 
and for another group of 10 companies, the increase was 66 
percent during a three-year period ending in 1928.
The growing demands for credit and the consequent mount­
ing of receivables has forced the credit problem to the atten­
tion of managers and officers of Iowa farmers’ elevators. In 
some cases the problem has become a real menace to the finan­
cial prosperity of the business. Many companies in recent years, 
however, have adopted more stringent credit terms. The aver­
age receivables for a limited number of companies which have 
adopted strict terms decreased $5,800 per company, and for 
another group which adopted moderately strict terms the 
decrease was $4,700. The comparison in each case was between 
the year preceding and the year - following the change in 
credit terms. Another group, however, following a liberal pol­
icy showed an average increase of $4,500.
RELATION BETWEEN RECEIVABLES AND CAPITAL 
Receivables and Total Assets
The question of how available capital is used in the business 
is an all-important one. Capital is costly and economy must 
be exercised in its use. Capital invested in receivables is usual-
TABLE IV. DISTRIBUTION OF FARMERS’ ELEVATORS ACCORDING TO THE 
__________ PERCENTAGE THAT RECEIVABLES ARE OF TOTAL ASSETS
Percent receivables are of 
total assets
Number of elevators Percent of elevators
Less than 10 9 9.7
10 to 19 36 38.7
20 to 29 31 33.3
30 to 39 13 ' 14.0
40 and over 4 4.3
Total 93 100.0
Highest 55 percent; average, 21.1 percent.
1Present Status of the Farmer Owned Elevators of Ohio, by B. A. Wallace, Ohio 
Experiment Station .Mimeographed Bulletin No. 21.
8
Bulletin, Vol. 24 [1930], No. 283, Art. 1
http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/bulletin/vol24/iss283/1
265
l y  regarded as yielding no direct returns,2 but for 93 companies, 
the receivables averaged 21.1 percent of the total capital em­
ployed in the business. A considerable part of the total capi­
tal is not used for retail business purposes (see table IV ).
Relation of Receivables to Outstanding Capital Stock
Another measure of the receivables is to compare them with 
the amount of capital stock outstanding. Table V shows that 
over half the elevators had receivables equal to or exceeding 
50 percent of the outstanding capital stock. One-sixth of them 
had receivables equal to or greater than the entire capital 
stock. The simple average of 93 companies was 73 percent. 
Exclusion of five companies with the highest percentages (200 
or over) reduced the average to 60 percent.
TABLE V. DISTRIBUTION OF 93 FARMERS’ ELEVATORS ACCORDING TO THE 
PERCENTAGE RECEIVABLES ARE OF CAPITAL STOCK OUTSTANDING
Receivables—percent of 
capital stock
Number of'elfevators Perch nt of elevators
Less than 25 14 15.0
25 to 49 29 31.2
50 to 74 21 22.6
75 to 99 13 14.0
100 and over 16 17.2
Total 93 100.0
Highest, 375 percent; simple average, 73 percent.
Receivables and Working Capital
A still more illuuminating comparison is that between receiv­
ables and the amount of capital available for carrying on cur­
rent operations—in other words, the working capital.
Table VI shows that receivables equal 91 percent of the
TABLE VI. COMPARISON BETWEEN RECEIVABLES AND WORKING CAPITAL 
OF 93 FARMERS’ ELEVATORS
Percent receivables are of 
working capital
Number of elevators Percent of elevators
Less than 25 8 8.6
25 to 49 19 20.4
50 to 74 17 18.3
75 to 99 15 16.1
100 to 199 9 9.7
200 to 299 5 5.4
300 and over 6 6.5
No working capital 14 15.0
Total » t 93 100.0
(Weighted average, 91 percent)
^Indirectly, it may attract additional business, thus reducing the overhead ex­
pense-per unit Of volume. This question will he discussed later.
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working capital. Only 29 percent of the companies had receiv­
ables amounting to less than 50 percent of their working capi­
tal, whereas 36.6 percent of them had receivables equal to or 
exceeding the amount of their working capital.
It is apparent from the foregoing that whether or not ade­
quate capital is available, an exceedingly large part of it is 
being used to finance receivables. That adequate capital is 
not generally available is borne out by the testimony of man­
agers and boards of directors and by the facts regarding 
borrowed money.
Receivables and Borrowed Money
Few boards of directors would look favorably upon borrow­
ing money for the specific purpose of investing the proceeds 
in receivables. Yet the average borrowings were $10,900, 
whereas receivables averaged $11,240. Table YII shows that 
total obligations increase faster than receivables.
TABLE VII. RELATION BETWEEN RECEIVABLES AND NOTES PAYABLE 
AND TOTAL OBLIGATIONS






Less than $ 5,000 21 $ 7,681 $10,870
$5,000 to $ 9,999 30 9,513 13,550
$10,000 to $14,999 23 11,260 16,380
$15,000 to $19,999 7 15,266 21,160
$20,000 to $24,999 6 20,060 25,600
$25,000 and «ver 6 25,730 40,783
Average $11,240 93 10,900 16,850
Of course, such a close relationship between receivables and 
borrowings does not exist in individual cases. Fifteen percent 
of the companies had no borrowed money. All of these carried 
.some receivables. Receivables averaged 76.5 percent of notes 
payable in 85 percent of the companies. More than one-third 
of the companies had receivables equal to or exceeding their 
notes payable.
Total liabilities, including notes payable, averaged $16,850. 
Average receivables were 67 percent of this figure. Receiv­
ables were less than the liabilities for two-thirds of the com­
panies and more than the liabilities for one-third of the com­
panies.
The amount of receivables is not the only factor which causes 
the liabilities to increase. Other factors are, volume of busi­
ness, size of inventories and cash balances, and lack of capital. 
The results of calculations showing these relationships are pre­
sented in table VIII and fig. 1. In these calculations, the'influ­
ence of volume was held constant by reducing the factors to 
percentage of sales.
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TABLE VIII. RELATION BETWEEN AMOUNT OF LIABILITIES, AND 
RECEIVABLES, INVENTORIES AND WORKING CAPITAL
Liabilities 































Less than $3 17 $ 1.61 33 41 $4.38 $7.73 $10.50
$3 to $5 21 4.55 58 81 4.38 8.60 8.43
$6 to $8 20 7.55 57 100 4.59 8.41 5.45
$9 to $11 12 10.47 77 100 6.20 9.96 5.69
$12 to $14 7 13.45 71 100 6.00 10.60 3.15
$15 to $24 8 20.05 75 100 8.15 10.10 —1.80
$25 and over 8 34.20 82 100 13.60 17.30 -3 .3 0
Average 93 10.33 73 85 6.34 10.39 6.40
Seventeen companies having less than $3 of liabilities per 
$.100 of sales, had $4.38 of receivables, $7.73 of inventories and 
$10.50 of working capital, per $100 of sales. Eight companies 
with liabilities of $25 or more per $100 of sales, however, had 
$13.60 of receivables, $17.30 of inventories and lacked work­
ing capital to the extent of $3.30 for each $100 of sales.
For each dollar of increase in liabilities, receivables increased 
an average of 29 cents, inventories increased 29 cents and 
working capital decreased 42 cents. A reduction in receivables 
would result in a material reduction in liabilities.
THE COST OF EXTENDING CREDIT 
It is from the point of view of costs that the credit problem 














£] WORKING CAPITAL-EXCESS OF NET 
WORTH OVER FIXED ASSETS
|  RECEIVABLES




LESS THAN *3  S3 TO 85 86TOS8 S9TOS1I $12 TO 814 $15 TO 824 825 AND OVER 
LIABILITIES PER 8100 OF SALES
Fig. 1. Relation between amount o f liabilities and working capital, receivables, 
inventories, etc.
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ing, collecting, stationery and postage are the important tangi­
ble costs of carrying retail credit.
Bad Debts
A satisfactory figure for bad debt cost can be obtained only 
by a study covering several years, as conditions affecting losses 
vary from year to year. Moreover, there is a tendency (see 
table IX) to write off bad and doubtful accounts in prosperous 
years. In many cases, especially where the books are not au­
dited, the customers’ ledger receives a “ going thru”  only at 
long intervals.























Less than $2,000 6 23 20.6 $450 $ 93
$2,000 - $3,999 20 10 66.6 1,045 675
$4,000 - $5,999 15 1 93.8 1,410 1,325
$6,000 and over 16 2 88.9 1,320 1,172
Average 57 36 61.3 1,130 686
♦Before deducting bad debts
A general idea of the importance of bad debts may be ob­
tained jfrom an examination of the. actual experience of 93 
companies for 1927-28, the results of which are presented in 
table X. Of 93 companies, 57 made a charge off and 36 did not. 
The average amount written off by 57 companies was $1,130 
per company. About one-third of them wrote off less than 
$500 each. A considerable proportion, however, wrote off 
$2,000 or more, the highest being over $4,000. The exceptionally 
large amounts obviously represent accumulations of bad ac­
counts over a period of years.
The average for the whole group may be considered a close 
approximation of bad debts chargeable against that year’s
TABLE X. BAD ACCOUNTS CHARGED OFF BY 93 COMPANIES, 1927-28
Amount written off Number of elevators Percent of elevators
None 36 38.7'
Less than $500 19 20.4
$500 -  $999 10 29 1 10.8 31.2
$1000- $1499 12 12.9
$1500- $1999 5 17 5.4 18.3
$2000- $2999 8 8.6
$3000- $3999 1 1.1
$4000- and over 2 2.1
Total 93 100.0
Highest amount $4,213; average for 93 companies $686; average 57 companies $1,130
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business for the 93 companies. The average thus calculated is 
$686, or 6.1 percent of the average amount of receivables. The 
57 companies referred to actually wrote off 8.8 percent of their 
receivables.
According to table XI losses from bad debts varied consid­
erably with volume of sales. Sixteen small-volume companies 
had losses averaging 2.8 percent of sales, while 15 large-volume 
companies averaged 0.79 percent. The average for the whole 
group was 1.41 percent. The losses were 9.1 percent of receiv­
ables for small-volume companies and 4.1 percent for large- 
volume companies.
TABLE XI. RELATION BETWEEN VOLUME OF SALES AND BAD DEBTS





Percent of sales* Percent of 
receivables*
Less than #20,000 16 $400.13 2.8 9.1
$20,000-#39,999 27 623.33 2.1 6.1
40,000- 59,999 24 880.00 1.7 8.5
60,000- 79,999 11 672.55 0.95 5.9
80,000 and over 15 848.00 0.79 4.1
Average 93 686.00 1.41 6.1
*For average sales and average receivables, see table II.
Bookkeeping and Office Costs
According to estimates of managers, the time spent in keep­
ing the books varied from one to two hours per day to the full 
time of two bookkeepers. The proportion of the total time 
which is chargeable to the credit business will vary according 
to volume of credit sales, methods of and facilities for doing 
the work and the frequency with which statements are sent 
out. Available data regarding the above and postage, station­
ery and collection costs suggest that $50 per month or $600 
per year is a fair average. This amount is 5.3'percent of the 
average receivables of $11,240. A Cornell University study3 
shows this cost to be $709 for 16 farm supply stores doing ap­
proximately the same volume of credit business and carrying 
approximately the same amount of receivables as the average 
Iowa farmers * elevator does.
Interest
The interest rate paid for loans varies from 5 to 8 percent, 
the rates most commonly paid at banks being 7 and 8 percent. 
The lower rates apply to loans obtained in a few cases from 
private sources. In calculating the cost of the credit service,
8An Economic Study of Rural Store Credit in New York, by Leland Spencer, 
Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 430.
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interest earned on notes receivable should be taken into ac­
count. The average amount of notes receivable carried by 93 
campanies was $1,310. Interest collected on accounts 'receiv­
able was found to be negligible on the average.
The above costs are brought together in the following sum­
mary, for which purpose the average amount of receivables 
carried was used as a basis for calculating the interest charge.
Interest, 7% on $11,240 $786.80
Less interest earned at 7% on notes receivable 
averaging $1,310 91.70
Net interest cost (6.2%) 695.10
Bad debts. (6.1%) of receivables ■ 686.00
Bookkeeping, collecting, etc. 5% of receivables 562.00
T O T A L----- ------------------------------------------ ------------ $1,943.10
This total credit cost of $1,943 may be compared with the 
average of $1,693 for 16 New York state rural feed stores, in 
which a 6 percent interest rate was used and somewhat smaller 
losses from bad debts were sustained.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CREDIT COST 
Credit Costs and Expenses
The proportion that the credit cost is of total expenses 
varied from 0.8 to 34.4 percent for individual companies. Cred­
it costs equaled or exceeded 20 percent of the expenses for 
over one-fifth of the companies. They equaled or exceeded 
10 percent of the expenses for two-thirds of them. The credit 
cost averaged 21.7 percent of average expenses, of $8,949 for 
93 companies. The potential saving thru credit control would 
be significant for many companies.
Credit Cost and Capital Stock Outstanding
The average credit cost of $1,943 is 9.1 percent of the aver­
age outstanding capital stock of $21,400. This percentage 
ranged from 0.7 percent to 44.0 percent for individual com­
panies. It equaled or exceeded 10 percent of the capital stock 
for 23 percent of the companies and for two-thirds of them it 
equaled or exceeded 5 percent of the capital stock. The dis­
tribution of the 93 companies is shown in table XII.
Credit Costs in Relation to Receivables
The relation of the credit cost to the receivables should be 
of special concern to the management. Would sales be booked 
as freely as they are if it were realized that the credit costs 
equaled $7.84 for each $100 of credit sales booked? And would 
as much be permitted to accumulate in receivables if it were 
realized that the credit cost equalled $17.29 a year for each
14
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TABLE XII. DISTRIBUTION OF 93 FARMERS’ ELEVATORS ACCORDING TO 
PERCENT THAT CREDIT COST IS OF CAPITAL STOCK
Credit cost—percent of 
capital stock
Number of elevators Percent of elevators
Less than 5 33 35.4









$100 of receivables carried? These are the average costs. The 
$17.29 is arrived at by dividing the average credit cost of 
$1,943 by the average receivables of $11,240, and the $7.84 by 
dividing the credit cost by $24,794, the average volume of 
credit sales. (See table XX, page 280.)
In individual cases it would, of course, be either more or less 
than this figure. The discount a particular company can afford 
to grant for cash payment will depend on interest actually paid 
and collected, the actual amount of bad accounts written off 
over a period of years, and the average time accounts run.
Credit Costs and Gross Margins
Dealers in farm supplies voice a rather general complaint 
that sidelines are being handled on too narrow a margin. Pat­
rons, on the other hand, are impelled to club their orders, pay 
cash and unload supplies from the car because of what appear 
to them to be wide margins. Both groups are right. From the 
dealer’s point of view, margins may seem too narrow in the 
light of the services rendered. From the point of view of the 
patron who is willing to dispense with some of these services, 
there is just ground for resentment when he cannot get a price 
commensurate with the services he desires. The price he pays 
is usually based on total services rendered, whether he uses 
them or not.
In this connection it is of interest to compare total average 
gross margins actually realized on sidelines by 93 farmers’ 
elevators and average credit cost. The gross profit was $4,860 
per company. The credit cost of $1,943 is 39.98 percent of the 
gross profit. Hence, it follows that a material reduction ip 
gross margins could be brought about by the adoption of a 
more strict credit policy.
The credit problem is significant from other points of view— 
its effect on volume of business, loyalty of patrons, difficulties 
in financing, unwillingness of substantial farmers to serve as
15
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directors, inability to take advantage of favorable prices in 
purchasing supplies, or of cash discounts. Most of these ques­
tions will be discussed in connection with the attempt to de­
termine the effect of credit policies on the financial results of 
handling sidelines and on the general business success of farm­
ers’ elevators.
PART II. DOES IT P A Y  TO SELL ON CR ED IT?
If credit costs absorb 39.98 percent of total gross profits 
earned on all sidelines, how much of the margin realized on 
credit sales alone is absorbed by credit costs? The average 
volume of credit sales was found to be $24,794 (p. 280) and 
gross profits on these sales $2,459. The average credit cost of 
$1,943 is 79 percent of the gross profit. A question may fairly 
be raised as to whether credit sales yield enough gross margins 
to cover the costs of handling them. Unless direct costs are 
met, any increase in such sales due to liberalizing the credit 
policy would only increase the losses, and unless such losses 
are counterbalanced by indirect ■ benefits accruing either to 
the sideline business or to other departments of the business, 
the business as a whole is worse off because of credit selling.
By direct costs is meant costs which would not be incurred 
if given business were not handled. Such direct costs include 
freight and drayage on supplies, costs of maintaining ware­
houses, including interest and insurance, extra labor for un­
loading, handling, selling and delivery, which would not other­
wise be employed, and the credit costs.
The sidelines, in addition to incurring these direct costs, also 
receive the benefit of managerial service in connection with 
buying and selling and general administration, of ta,xes, gen­
eral advertising, auditing, directors’ fees, of warehousing furn­
ished by the elevator proper and of other services, a portion 
of« the costs of which would normally be charged to sidelines 
if the purpose was to calculate total costs of handling side­
lines. In many cases, however, some if not most of these costs 
would be the same even tho no sidelines were handled, and 
the company may properly consider that if sidelines cover 
the direct costs they at least incur no loss to the company. 
They do not, however, in such cases yield any financial benefit. 
To do so they must contribute something toward meeting costs 
of services of which they receive the benefit indirectly; and if 
they are to contribute anything toward a reduction of overhead 
expenses in other departments, they would need to yield mar­
gins in excess of direct and indirect costs chargeable to them. 
Some companies will have much lower direct costs than other
16
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companies, depending upon the extent to which sidelines are 
handled with existing facilities and labor. The larger the side­
line volume, the greater the likelihood that extra costs are in­
curred.
CREDIT SELLING AND PROFITS ON TOTAL SIDELINE SALES
The question of whether the handling of sidelines results in 
net gains or net losses can be answered for a particular com­
pany only by a comparison of its sideline costs with its 
margins. This would involve a detailed analysis and allocation 
of its expenses. Credit costs would enter into such an analysis. 
The purpose here is to compare credit costs with sideline mar­
gins, thus throwing some light on the question of whether, or 
not it pays to sell on credit.
The relationship between credit costs and margins on total 
sideline sales will be discussed first.
Credit Costs and Margins on Total Sideline Sales
In this analysis, credit costs were deducted from gross mar­
gins for each individual company. The companies were then 
classified according to the size of the remaining margin, ex­
pressed as a percentage of sideline sales. Table XIII gives the 
results.
It is apparent that handling costs as low as 5 percent would 
exceed the remaining margins for 29 percent of the companies. 
Successive additions of 1 percent to the handling costs, until 
10 percent is reached, result in significant increases in the pro­
portions of companies whose total gross margins would fail 
to meet such additions.
TABLE XIII. SIDELINE MARGINS REMAINING AFTER DEDUCTING CREDIT
COSTS
Margin after deducting credit Number of companies Percent of companies
cost—percent of sales




01.0 to 1.9 2 2.42 0 to 2.9 3 3.2 •3.0 to 3.9 10 19.74.0 to 4.9 10 10.7
Less than 5 27 29.3
5.0 to 5.9 13 14.06.0 to 6.9 12 12.97.0 to 7.9 10 10.88.0 to 8.9 8 8.69.0 to 9.9 9 9.7
■5.0 to 9.9 5 52 56.0
10.0 and over 14 15.0
Total 93 100.0
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Many companies are obviously making a financial success 
of their sideline business, either because they are in a position 
to realize adequate margins and to keep handling costs down, 
or because their credit policy is such that the credit costs are 
kept at a minimum. It will, therefore, be of interest to note 
the effect of different credit policies upon the profitableness 
of handling sidelines.
Effect of Credit Policy on Profits
The numerical measure of the credit policy used was the 
ratio of receivables to the volume of sideline sales. In general, 
a group of companies having a small amount on the books in 
relation to sideline sales are obviously restricting their credit 
»more than a group that has a large amount of receivables as 
compared with sideline sales. A company may, under this 
classification, fall into the restricted credit group even tho the 
bulk of its sales are credit sales. To do so, however, it would 
need to limit credit extensions both as to amount and time, 
and select its risks carefully.
The 93 companies included in this part of the analysis were 
accordingly first classified into three major groups: 1. Those 
whose receivables were less than 15 percent of sideline sales:
2. Those whose receivables were 15 to 29 percent of sideline 
sales: 3. Those showing a ratio of 30 percent or over. The 
companies included in groups 1 and 3 which were following 
more extreme policies were Segregated into two additional 
groups—-those whose receivables were less than 10 percent 
of sideline sales, and those whose ratio was 40 percent or over.
The consistency of the behavior of the figures seems to give 
weight to the averages for these additional groups, even tho 
the number of cases included in each of them is too small to 
warrant attributing much independent significance to them.
When the credit policy, as above defined, is taken into con­
sideration, one reason why some companies are able to handle 
sindelines more profitably than others is made apparent. Table 
XIV shows that the margins, after deducting credit costs, 
were 2.4 times as large for the second group as for the fourth 
group. The remaining margins for the liberal credit groups are 
so small on the average that little if any profits can be realized 
except when extreme economy in handling prevails, or when 
exceptionally wide margins are taken.
The total margins actually taken by strict credit companies 
vs. liberal credit companies in order to provide given handling 
margins are presented in table XV. The liberal credit groups 
in every case operated on wider margins than the strict credit 
groups, the average difference being 15.5 percent. This in-
18
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TABLE XIV. EFFECT OF CREDIT POLICY ON SIDELINE MARGINS 
REMAINING AFTER DEDUCTING CREDIT COSTS
Receivables—percent of 
sideline sales
Number of companies Sideline margins, after 
deducting credit costs 
percent of sales
Less than 10 9 9.4
Less than 15 22 7.9
15 to 29 39 5.1
30 and over 32 3.3
40 and over 15 —0.3
Simple average 93 5.2
creased margin, however, yielded the liberal credit companies 
a handling margin of only 3.3 percent after deducting credit 
costs, compared with 7.9 percent for the strict credit group.
When those companies in each group whose remaining mar­
gins were the same were selected and their total gross margins 
compared, the difference in the gross margins was much great­
er. For instance, the gross margins for the strict credit com­
panies which had a margin of 5 percent or less after deducting 
credit costs, was 5.9 percent of sales, compared with 8.7 per­
cent for the liberal credit companies whose remaining margin 
was also 5 percent or less. The latter’s gross margin is 47.5 
percent larger than the former. Likewise, the liberal credit 
companies required a gross margin 32.2 percent greater than 
did the strict credit .companies in order to provide handling 
margins from 5.1 percent to 10.0 percent of sales; and in order 
to yield net handling margins of 10.1 percent and over, the lib­
eral companies required a gross margin 27.1 percent greater 
than did the strict credit companies.
TABLE XV. MARGINS TAKEN BY STRICT VS. LIBERAL CREDIT COMPANIES 
IN ORDER TO YIELD GIVEN HANDLING MARGINS
Handling margin 
(total margin 

















by liberal vs. 
strict credit 
companies in 














5 and less 2 5.9 13 8.7 47.5
5.1 to 10.0 14 9.0 15 11.9 32.2
lu.lsand over 6 12.9 4 16.4 27.1
Average total
margin 22 9.7 32 11.2 15.5
Average margin 
less credit cost 7.9 3.3
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The credit policy was also found to have considerable in­
fluence on the number of companies realizing given net handl­
ing margins. Ninety percent of the strict prédit companies, 
compared with 33 percent of the liberal credit companies, real­
ized net handling margins equal to 5 percent of sales ; and 80 
percent of the strict credit companies compared with 13 percent 
of the liberal credit companies, earned net handling margins 
as high as 7 percent of sales (see table XVI).
TABLE XVI. EFFECT OF CREDIT POLICY ON NET HANDLING MARGINS*
Receivables—percent of 
sideline sales Percent of companies realizing net handling margins* equal to:
Five percent of sales Seven percent of sales
Less than 10 90 80
Less than 15 91 6515 to 29 69 3830 and over 59 38
40 and over 33 13
♦Total gross margin less credit costs.
The decrease in the number of companies able to meet given 
handling costs in addition to credit costs as the credit policy 
becomes more liberal, is due to the behavior of credit costs in 
relation to margins. The effect oi credit policy on credit costs 
is very pronounced and is due to its effect not only on the 
amount of bad debt losses but on the amount of receivables 
carried and on the time accounts run.
Effect of Credit Policy on Credit Costs
Table XVII shows that the liberal companies carried about 
4.5 times the receivables the strict companies did and allowed 
over 10 times as much time. Receivables were ony 4.9 percent
TABLE XVII. RELATION BETWEEN CREDIT POLICY AND AMOUNT OF 



















on booksAccounts Notes Total
Less than 10 9 $3,000 $163 $3 ,163 $64 ,333 4.9 0.6
Less than 15 22 5,984 416 6,400 63 ,800 10.2 1 215 to 29 39 9 ,750 980 10 ,730 49 ,200 21.8 2 630 and over 32 12 ,880 2,320 15 ,200 37 ,800 40.2 4.8
40 and over 15 11,569 2,731 14 ,300 . 26,133 54.9 6.6
Average 9,930 1,310 11,240 4$ ,731 23.1 2.77
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of annual sales for the first group, whereas the percentage was 
54.9 for the last group.
Variations such as the above must affect credit costs in a 
marked degree. Table XVIII shows the effect of liberal credit 
on losses from bad accounts, which rose from an average of 
$128 per company for the strict companies to $1145 tor the
fourth group.










0.2 4.1Less than 10 $128
Less than 15 












40 and over 1,060 4.1
Average 686 1.4 6.1
Bad account losses increase even more rapidly when consid­
ered as percentages of sideline sales. They were only 0.2 per­
cent of sales for the first group, but rose consistently to 4.1 
percent for the last group.
As a percentage of receivables, these losses are also consid­
erably higher for the most liberal group than for the most re­
stricted group, and except^ for the middle group, they tend 
to increase as the credit policy becomes more liberal.
Interest, bad debts and bookkeeping costs are brought to­
gether in table XIX. The averages range from $496 per com­
pany for the strict companies to $2,807 for the fourth group. 
The costs in percent of sideline sales are almost 13 times greater














(5 percent of 
receivables)
Total credit ccst




Less than 10 $210 $128 $158 $ 496 0.77





















40 and over 810 1,060 715 2,585 9.89 18.1
Average 695 686 | 562 1,943 3.99 17.3
♦Notes receivable excluded.
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for the most liberal group than for the most restricted group, 
the range being from 9.89 percent to 0.77 percent of sales.
Of special significance are the figures in the last column, 
showing that the credit costs for the different groups of com­
panies, range from $15.70 to $18.50 a year for each $100 of 
receivables.
Credit Policy and Gross Margins
The increase in credit costs due to liberalizing the credit 
policy is so great that unless there is a corresponding increase 
in gross margins, losses must result. Fig. 2 shows that mar­
gins do not increase correspondingly. Whereas credit costs for 
the most liberal group are 13 times those of the strictest group, 
the margins show only an irregular tendency to increase.
Receivables- 
Per Cent of 
Sideline Sales
Gross Margins— Per Cent of Sideline Sales
Per
Cent 2 4 6 8 10 12
Less than 10
Less than 15 








— — — —
— — — — -  —  •—  ----
Pig. 2. Relation between credit policy ant} gross margins on sideline sales.
Credit costs are compared with gross margins for each group 
of companies in fig. 3.
On the average, when receivables exceed 30 percent of the 
total sideline sales, credit costs are so high that little is left of 
the gross profit on the entire sideline business. The margins 
necessary to cover the credit costs and an allowance of 5 per­
cent for handling are 12.43 percent and 14.89 percent, respec­
tively, for the last two groups as compared with 5.77 percent 
and 6.77 percent, respectively, for the first and second groups. 
The credit cost alone absorbed almost the entire gross profit for 
the last group.
Thus far in this discussion the volume considered was the 
total sideline sales. Such a comparison, however, fails to show 
the benefit to the company of the credit sales, which alone are 
responsible for credit costs. Failure to thus relate the credit 
costs results in most companies being deluded as to the finan­
cial desirability of such additions to volume as may be at­
tracted by granting credit. An attempt will therefore bp made 
to determine the relationship between margins and costs on
22


























|  CREDIT CO STS
□  GROSS MARGINS
LESS THAN 10 LESS THAN 15 15 TO 29 30 AND OVER 40 AND OVER
RECEIVABLES—PERCENT OF SIDELINE. SALES
Fig. 3. Effect o f credit policy on relation between credit costs and gross margins 
on total sideline sales.
credit sales. Incidenally, the effect of variations in credit pol­
icy on profit will also be shown.
COSTS AND MARGINS ON CREDIT SALES
The credit sales for 83 companies averaged 50.6 percent of 
total retail sales. On this basis the volume of credit sales 
would average $24,794. ,
How much gross profit did this volume of credit sales yield? 
The information, discussed later, regarding the granting of 
cash discounts and the charging of interest on account, and 
the prevailing practice of quoting one price whether fhe sale 
is for cash or on credit, suggest that gross margins on credit 
sales would not, on the average, be materially different from 
those on cash sales.
Since the gross profits on total sidelines averaged $4,860, 
the gross profits on the credit sales would, therefore, be $2,459. 
The average credit cost of $1,943 is 79 percent of this amount, 
and the amount of the gross profit available for handling ex­
penses. after deducting credit costs, would be only $516, which 
is 2.08’percent of the credit sales. This percentage would yield 
three-fourths cent on a 36-cent post, 21 cents on a $10 ton of 
coal, $1.25 on a $60 ton of tankage and 25 cents on a $12 
hundredweight of twine.
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So much for the profitableness to the average company of 
the business done on the average credit basis. Our purpose 
now will be to determine the effect of credit policy on profits 
realized on credit sales.
TABLE X X . TOTAL SIDELINE SALES AND GROSS PROFITS, AND CREDIT SALE 









Credit sales Average gross 
profits on 
sidelines
Gross profit on 
credit sales
Less than 15 

















Average 48,731 50.6 24 ,794 4,860 2,459
Credit Policy and Profits on Credit Sales
The calculations involved in this analysis are presented in 
tables X X  and XXI. The rapid rise in the ratio of credit costs 
to credit sales from 4.51 percent to 12.04 percent, and the rapid 
disappearance of profits, as the credit policy becomes more 
and more liberal, should be noted. On the average, there ap­
pears to be a reasonable prospect of realizing profits adequate 
to meet handling costs after credit costs are deducted only 
when receivables are kept under 15 percent of annual sales. 
Credit costs alone exceeded total gross profits for the most 
liberal credit group, and even for ther most strict group a handl­
ing cost of 5 percent of sales would on the average absorb al­
most all that remains of the gross profits after deducting 
credit costs.
TABLE XXI. EFFECT OF CREDIT POLICY ON RATIO BETWEEN CRE D IT GOST 
AND GROSS MARGINS ON CREDIT SALES AND BETWEEN CREDIT 























Less than 15 




















Average 2,459 1,943 79.02 7.84 9.9 2.08
Credit Policy and Credit Costs
This rapid rise in the ratio of credit costs to credit sales is 
explained by the increase in receivables carried and in the time 
accounts run as the credit policy becomes more liberal.
_ According to table XXII the liberal credit companies car­
ried 2.4 as much in receivables as the strict credit companies,
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Less than 15 














Average 24 ,794 11,240 45.3
5.4
and in addition granted their customers 2.5 times as much time 
in settling the accounts. Interest and bad accounts pile up as 
a consequence, as is shown in table XXIII. ,
Interest costs rose from 1.67 percent of credit sales for the 
most strict group to 3.87 percent for the most liberal group, an 
increase of 2.3 times. Bad debts, however, increased from l.b 
to 4.9 percent, an increase of 3.1 times. Bookkeeping, etc., in­
creased from 1.3 percent to 3.3 percent or 2.5 times.





Credit costs—pereent of credit sales
Interest Bad debts Bookkeeping collecting, etc.
Total
Less than 15 

















Average 24,794 2.80 2.77 2.27
7.84
Since interest was figured at a uniform rate of 7 percent, 
why should the interest cost increase? The answer is found in 
the longer time the accounts remain uncollected under a i 
eral policy. The time was 3.1 months for the strict group, but 
rose to 7.8 months for the most liberal group. The latter is 
times the former and accounts for the entire increase m the-
lT ltPTPQ t p A c f
This increase in the time accounts run also has an effect on 
the ratio of bad debts to credit sales. Bad debts losses tend to 
increase faster than the time accounts run Whereas the time 
increased 2.5 times, the losses increased 3.1 times. The liberal­
ity which results in granting patrons m o r e  time also results m 
granting credit to a poorer class of risks. Time alone is a factor 
in that many accounts which are good when opened will be­
come uncollectible if permitted to run too long, due to bad 
bookkeeping, forgetfulness on the part of patrons, and to finan­
cial difficulties of patrons which may develop.
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Bookkeeping, collecting, and office costs should increase as 
a percentage of credit sales as the credit policy becomes more 
liberal, due to repeated sending of statements, increased col­
lecting effort and collecting costs, more disputes over accounts 
and errors in accounting.
Margins Necessary on Credit Sales
If credit sales alone are to bear credit costs, additions to han­
dling margins will have to be larger than when credit costs are 
spread over total sideline sales. Whereas credit costs are 3.99 
percent of average total sales, they are 7.84 percent of average 
credit sales. The addition to margins necessary, however, is 
only 4.51 percent for the strictest group, as compared with 
12.04 percent for the most liberal group.. Credit costs are 
shown in fig. 4 in comparison with the gross margins realized 
on credit sales for each credit policy group.
When credit costs are deducted from gross margins on credit 
sales, the net handling margin is 5.19 percent of credit sales 
for the first group, 2.55 percent for the second group, and
0.84 percent for the third group. Hence, there appears to be 
a reasonable prospect of realizing profits on credit sales only 
when receivables are kept below 15 percent of the total sales.
credit 'sal^s^eCt ° f  credit policy on relation between credit costs and gross margins
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MARGINS REALIZED ON INDIVIDUAL COMMODITIES
In the foregoing, comparisons were made between the credit 
costs and average margins realized on sidelines. The average 
margin for a given company is itself composed of margins on a 
number of individual commodities. An analysis of margins on 
individual commodities realized by 93 companies (fig. 5) shows 
that many companies handled some commodity which yielded 
no margin at all, and others which yielded exceedingly small 
margins, even tho the company may have realized a satisfac­
tory average margin on its total sideline business. A rather 
large proportion of the companies, however, realized small 
average gross profits on the total sideline sales.
A striking difference in the margins realized on different 
commodities is apparent. Salt averaged the highest margin, 
whereas twine averaged the lowest, the former being more than 
double the latter. Another striking fact revealed is the wide 
range in margins realized on the same commodity by different 
companies. Margins on salt, for instance, ranged from 2 per­
cent to over 30 percent; on lumber, from 4 to 23 percent; on 
coal and fencing, from a gross loss to a margin of over 25 per­
cent. Twine and feed show the narrowest range—from 0 to 16 
percent for feed, and from 0 to 12 percent for twine. The 
simple average margin on all commodities for all companies 
was 9.35 percent.
It is apparent that the sideline business is indeed a problem. 
In some cases it appears that the size of the margin realized 
is almost entirely a matter of chance. Competition and price 
fluctuations are undoubtly important factors contributing to 
the difficulties. But buying practices, shrinkages and losses 
due to damage, carelessness in recording sales, especially credit 
sales, carelessness in taking inventories, and perhaps other fac­
tors under the control of the management, are also important 
factors. In contrast with this situation are companies whose 
managers succeed fairly consistently, year after year, in realiz­
ing a reasonable margin on every commodity handled. \]
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, it must be concluded 
that the prospects are meager of realizing a profit either on 
credit sales alone or on the entire sideline business when a lib­
eral credit policy is followed. Individual companies may suc­
ceed in such an attempt either by taking sufficiently wide mar­
gins or by so controlling the credit as to keep credit costs well 
below margins. Companies not in a position to do either of 
these things must either realize significant indirect benefits 
that tend to make the business as a whole more profitable, 
which fit is frequently held result from liberal extension of 
credit, or the entire business must suffer.
27
Robotka: Retail credit in Iowa farmers’ elevators
Published by Iowa State University Digital Repository, 1930
Fig. 5. MARGINS ACTUALLY REALIZED ON COMMODITIES SPECIFIED BY 93 FARMERS’ ELEVATORS IN 1927-28
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INDIRECT BENEFITS OF CREDIT SELLING
If indirect benefits are actually being realized, the fact 
ishould be revealed in terms of financial and operating ratios 
which reflect financial strength, economy of operations, and 
iother evidences of prosperity of the business as a whole.
The first question to be considered is, what, if any, is the in­
fluence of the credit policy on total expenses? It has already 
been shown that credit costs increased from an average of 
$496, when receivables were less than 10 percent of sales, to 
$2,807, when receivables were 30 percent or over of sales. If, 
due to liberal credit, indirect benefits are actually being real­
ized to such a degree that total expenses are reduced, these 
benefits must be important enough to over-balance the in­
creases in credit costs.
Expenses are, of course, influenced by other factors than 
credit policy. Volume of business is probably the most im­
portant factor. But according to table XXIV, increases in 
grain volume decrease expenses, while increases in sideline 
volume increase expenses. Of the two, grain volume seems to 
be the more important.
TABLE XXIV. EFFECT OF VARYING PROPORTIONS BETWEEN GRAIN AND 
SIDELINE BUSINESS ON EXPENSES IN PERCENT OF SALES


















































Moreover, table XXV shows that strict credit companies 
handled more sidelines and less grain than liberal credit com­
panies. It is, therefore, necessary to make allowances for 
variations in grain and sideline volumes (to “ hold them con­
stant” ) before the influence of receivables on expenses can 
be revealed. The results of such calculations are presented 
graphically in fig. 6, in which graph “ A ”  shows the relation­
ship between grain volume and expenses independent of the 
influence of sideline sales and of receiveables. Graph “ B ”  
shows the “ net”  relationship between sideline sales and ex­
penses, and graph “ C,”  between receivables and expenses.
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RECEIVABLES -PERCENT OF SIDELINE SALES
Fig. 6. Effect o f the three factors—grain sales, sideline sales, and receivables—on 
expenses, in each case independent of the influence o f the other two factors.
A. Relation between grain volume and expenses, assuming that all companies 
have average sideline sales and average receivables.
B. Relation between sideline sales and expenses when allowance is made for in­
fluence of grain sales and amount o f receivables.
C. Relation between receivables and expenses when allowance is made for in­
fluence of variations in grain volume and in sideline sales.
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TABLE XXV. COMPARISON OF BUSINESS OF 93 FARMERS’ ELEVATORS CLASSI­










and lumber sales 
are of total sales, 
exclusive of 
livestockSidelines
Lumber Grain Livestock Total
Less than 10 9 $60 ,000 $4,333 • $137 ,800 $37 ,000 $239 ,133 32
Less than 15 22 57,100 6,700 133 ,000 73,400 267 ,700 31
15 to 29 39 40 ,600 8,600 153 ,500 53 ,000 255 ,700 24
30 and over 32 31,600 6,200 181,000 13 ,900 232 ,700 17
40 and over 15 25 ,200 933. 193 ,800 10 ,200 230,133 12
Average 93 41,406 7,325 158,113 44 ,372 251,216 23.6
The latter graph gives the answer we are seeking. Con­
trary to the view frequently expressed liberal credit is asso­
ciated with increases in expenses of the business as a whole. 
The average increase is 0.275 percent of total sales for each in­
crease in receivables equal to 10 percent of sideline sales. On 
the basis of average total sales of $206,844, each increase in re­
ceivables equal to 10 percent of sideline sales is accompanied 
by an increase of $568.82 in actual expenses. When receiv­
ables increase from 0 to 30 percent of sideline sales, the accom­
panying increase in actual expenses is $1,706.46.
The fact that the increase in actual expenses is almost as 
large as calculated credit costs of $1943 indicates that on the 
average, extra expenses are actually incurred for nearly all 
the capital and labor and other costs involved in carrying re­
ceivables, and that there are no counterbalancing “ economies”  
due to liberal credit which tend to reduce general expenses.
Table XXVI shows the relationship between credit policy 
and expenses both before and after allowance had been made 
for the influence of volume of grain and of sidelines. Uncor­
rected, the expenses are lower for liberal than for strict com­
panies. The corrected expenses, however, are lower for strict 
companies.
TABLE XXVI. RELATION BETWEEN CREDIT POLICY AND EXPENSES
Receivables—percent of 
sideline sales
Expenses in percent of total sales,—livestock excluded
Not corrected for grain 
and sideline volumes
Corrected for grain 
and sideline volumes
Less than 10 5.27 3.67
Less than 15 » 5.30 3.70
15 to 29 4.46 3.95
30 and over 3.95 4.49
40 and over 3.86 4.65
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Although the expense ratio is an important index of operat­
ing efficiency, it may not in itself adequately reflect the influ­
ence of credit policy on the business as a whole* Net profits, 
and certain financial ratios will be considered next.
Credit Policy and Financial Condition
A comparison between credit policy and net profits, surplus 
per dollar of share capital and the current ratio is presented 
in table XXVII. The net profit factor, like the expense factor 
just discussed, constitutes a test based on the results of a sin­
gle year, but the other two factors reveal the cumulative re­
sults of operations for a period of time.
According to table XXVII, net profits dropped from 1.38 
percent of sales for the strict group to 0.87 percent for the 
liberal group. The amount of surplus per dollar invested is 
significantly lower for the liberal group than for either of the 
other groups, the larger value for the middle group being due 
to the fact that this group averaged $5,000 less share capital 
than the other groups (see table X X IX ). The amount of sur­
plus is not in itself a reliable index of profitable operations. A 
prosperous company is not likely to accumulate a surplus in 
proportion to its ability to do so. It would, however, at least 
maintain the value of its shares at par. The liberal credit corn- 
panes were less fortunate in this respect than the strict credit 
companies. Only 1 of the 22 companies in the strictest group 
had no surplus, but 8 of the 39 companies in the second group 
and 8 of the 32 in the last group had no surplus.
The last measure of prosperity considered is the “ Current 
Ratio,”  i.e., the number of dollars of current assets a company 
has for each dollar of liabilities. This ratio is regarded as an 
important measure of financial strength. According to table 
XXVII, the strict companies had $3.30 of current assets, but 
the liberal companies had only $1.84 of current assets, for each 
dollar of liabilities.













Less than 15 $25,073 $3.30 $0.34 $1.38
15 to 29 26,568 2.08 0.44 0.80
30 and over 23,323 1.84 0.24 0.87
The effect of volume of business upon these ratios has been 
found to be negligible as compared with the effect of the credit 
policy (see table XXVIII). Volume of sidelines and grain com-
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TABLE XXVIII. EFFECT OF CREDIT POLICY COMPARED WITH EFFECT OF 
VOLUME OF SALES ON FINANCIAL RATIOS
Receivables- Average volume Current assets Surplus per Net profit,
percent of 
sideline sales
Class* of sales per dollar of 
liabilities
dollar invested percent of 
total sales
A—Total volume of sales









15 to 29 (1 135 ,800 2.08 0.20 0.75(11 279 ,000 2.08 0.77 1.00









B—Volume of sideline sales









15 to 29 (1 28 ,000 2.06 0.40 0.70(11 71,000 2..10 0.47 0.90









*Class I: Companies whose volume of sales was less than average for group. 
Class II: Companies whose volume of sales was more than average for group.
bined had some influence on profits and surplus in the second 
and third credit policy groups, but practically none on the cur­
rent ratio. Volume of sidelines has some influence but only 
when a moderate volume is compared with a small volume, as 
in the third credit policy group.
If a liberal credit policy has any tendency to benefit the 
company indirectly thru building up good will, reducing gener­
al overhead expenses, or otherwise, the results fail to appear 
in terms of increased volume of business or in terms of any of 
the measures of financial prosperity which have been studied. 
On the contrary, the evidence presented here and in subsequent 
discussions seems positively to support the opposite point of 
view.
This phase of thé study will be concluded by a brief survey 
of the relation between credit policy and adequacy of capital, 
which also has an indirect bearing on financial prosperity.
Capital Stock and Surplus
The question is sometimes raised as to whether or not re­
strictive credit policies are adopted primarily by companies 
which lack capital. No doubt this is true in some cases, but 
the data '“in table X X IX  regarding capital stock, surplus, and 
working capital, show a tendency the other way. Altho share 
capital shows no decided trend, no relative lack is indicated 
by the companies which follow the most restrictive credit
33
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■ Average amount per company
Capital per $1,( 
sales, exclusive










Less than 10 9 $21,800 $11,030 15,200 $47 ,600 $162 $236
Less than 15 22 23 ,800 8,000 14 ,380 46 ,100 164 238
15 to 29 39 18,100 5,800 11,900 47 ,000 129 232
30 and over 32 23 ,800 5,800 11,600 57 ,200 135 261
40 and over 15 23,500 4,700 10 ,400 53 ,700 128 244 •
policy. Both surplus and working capital are largest for these 
companies. As was previously pointed out, however, these 
companies handle a relatively large volume of sidelines, hence, 
they may actually experience a greater relative lack of capital 
than the figures reveal. The larger total capital (total of all 
assets) for the liberal credit groups reflects the use of more 
capital in financing relatively larger amounts of receivables. A 
comparison of combined capital and surplus with total sales, 
exclusive of livestock, shows that the more restricted groups had 
more capital per $1,000 of sales than the liberal credit groups. 
The liberal companies, however, used more total capital per 
$1,000 of sales.
Additional light is thrown on the relative adequacy or in­
adequacy of capital by comparing surplus and working capital, 
pn the one hand, with current assets and volume of total busi­
ness, on the other hand. See table XXX. Here again the evi­
dence tends fo establish the fact that strict credit companies 
are more adequately financed than liberal credit companies. 
How much of the result is due to the credit policy is again a 
question. Perhaps both the restrictive policy and the favorable 
financial situation are the result of other factors, such as good 
general management, and more skilled merchandising of both 
grain and sidelines.
TABLE X X X . RELATION BETWEEN SURPLUS AND WORKING CAPITAL AND 
CURRENT ASSETS AND VOLUME OF SALES FOR 93 FARMERS’ ELEVATORS 




Surplus W orking Capital
Percent of current 
assets
Per $1,000 of 
total sales
Percent of current 
assets
Per $1,000 of 
total sales*
Less than 10 46 $54.60 63 $75.20
33 41.20 59 74.00
15 to 29 28 39.47 41 58.80
30 and over 17 26.50 35 53.00
40 and over 15 21.40 33 47.30
♦Livestock excluded.
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A final test of the adequacy of capital is the relation of bor­
rowed capital to total capital requirements, i.e., total of all 
assets.
Fig. 7 shows that strict credit companies borrowed from 7 
to 13 percent of the total capital requirement, whereas the lib­
eral companies borrowed almost one-fourth of their total capi­
tal. The difference cannot be accounted for in terms of differ­
ences in volume of business, share capital, or surplus, as dif­
ferences in these items are insignificant in comparison.
Reoeivables- 
Per Cent of 
Sideline Sales
Notes Payable— Per Cent of Total Capital
Per
Cent 3.0 20 30




P A - f i
f 8 3 . 5
—  — ----------------
Fig. 7. Relation between credit policy and proportion of total capital which is 
borrowed.
A question of prime consideration to the management of a 
farmers’ elevator is how to reduce the amount of borrowed 
money. The relationship between receivables and notes pay­
able discussed on page 266 was the relationship between the 
amount of receivables, on the one hand, and the amount of 
notes payable  ^and other liabilities, on the other hand. A strik­
ing increase in the latter was there shown to accompany in­
creases in receivables. Figure 8 shows that the necessity of 
borrowing is very closely related to the credit policy. Almost 
the whole of each dollar added to the receivables as a result 
of liberalizing the credit policy had to be borrowed.
In the foregoing attempt to ascertain the effect of credit 
policy on the general prosperity of farmers’ elevators, any 
tendency revealed at all should be regarded as significant, in­
asmuch as the analysis is based upon a group of companies 
representing a wide range of local conditions. Moreover, the 
total sideline business of the group studied was only 23.6 per­
cent of their total business exclusive of livestock (see table 
XXV). v
When a policy which applies to only one-fourth of the busi­
ness affects the total net results to the extent indicated, its in­
fluence must be significant indeed.
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Receivables- Receivables and Notes Payable
Percent of 
Sideline Sales Item




3; 420Less than 10
--------------------------------------------- -----




15 to 29 Notes Payable 11,600
Receivables 
Notes Payable
1 5 I 200
13,700






Fig. 8. Relation between credit policy, receivables and notes payable.
The discussion thus far has dealt with the credit problem 
from the point of view of the farmers’ elevator business. Brief 
consideration will now be given to the problem from the point 
tof view of what retail credit costs the patron. In view of the 
post to the elevator of rendering this service, is it good business 
for the patron to get his credit from this source? The answer 
depends upon how much patrons pay for the credit.
PART III. COST TO PATRONS OF R E TA IL  CREDIT
 ^A direct answer to the above question is impossible because 
probably no two patrons pay at the same rate. If all credit 
patrons paid their accounts, if all received the same terms and 
all paid the same prices for the goods, then all would be pay­
ing for the credit service at the same rate. But some patrons 
do not pay their bills at all, others pay cash, and others pay 
in from several days to several years. Some receive cash dis- 
counts, a few are charged a higher price for goods when bought 
on credit, and some pay interest on accounts. Moreover, much 
depends on the extent to which credit costs are borne by the 
sidelines. The net result is that many cash patrons pay for 
service they do not receive, many credit patrons pay less than 
it costs to render the service and others pay at an exorbitant 
»rate.
A R E  C R E D I T  C O S T S  P A I D  B Y  S I D E L I N E  P A T R O N S ?
Much of what has been said about whether or not it pays 
the company to sell on credit has a bearing on this question. 
According to table XIII, if an allowance of 5 percent were 
made to cover handling costs, 71 percent of the companies 
were able to include the entire cost of handling sidelines in 
the prices charged. If an allowance, however, of 7 percent
36
Bulletin, Vol. 24 [1930], No. 283, Art. 1
http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/bulletin/vol24/iss283/1
29i
were made for handling costs, only 44.1 percent of the com­
panies passed total costs on to their supply patrons. Practically 
all companies were able to include some of the credit costs in 
the prices charged for supplies. According to table XXXI, 87 
percent of the credit costs was paid by patrons when 5 per­
cent was allowed for handling costs. This percentage dropped 
to 62 when 7 percent was allowed for handling costs. The per­
centage of credit costs included in the price was lower for lib­
eral credit companies than for strict credit companies.
TABLE X X X I. PERCENTAGE OF C RE D IT COST RECOUPED B Y IN DIVID U AL 
COMPANIES OUT OF TOTAL GROSS PROFITS ON SIDELINES
Receivables-—-percent 
of sideline sales
Percent of credit cost recouped under specified handling charge
5 Percent 6 Percent 7 Percent
Less than 10 98 84 80
Less than 15 98 86 72
15-29 85 71 56
30 and over 83 75 64
40 and over 73 61 48
Simple averages 87 75 62
Percentage of Credit Cost Borne by Credit Patrons
If the entire sideline business fails to carry credit costs to 
the extent indicated, to what extent does the business done on 
credit alone carry them ?
Since the credit sales are about half the total retail sales 
the gross profits on credit sales would be approximately half 
the profits on total sales. Hence only half as much of the credit 
costs could be recouped when spread over credit sales alone 
as when spread over total sideline sales. The percentage re­
couped would, therefore, be 43.5 when 5 percent is allowed for 
handling costs, and 31 percent when 7 percent is allowed.
Patrons Cannot Escape Credit Costs
Whatever the percentage of credit cost paid directly by pat­
rons thru enhanced prices on supplies, the total cost must, in 
the last analysis, be paid in some manner or the elevator com­
pany must close its doors. In the case of a farmers’ elevator, 
credit patrons are also largely cash patrons and grain patrons, 
and a considerable proportion of them are stockholders. Hence, 
patrons will pay the credit costs ultimately, either thru higher 
prices on supplies, lower prices for grain, loss of dividends and 
sometimes everi of invested capital, or thru an impairment of 
services and facilities provided by the company.
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What, then, is the burden thus paid by the patrons ? It can be i 
best measured by reducing it to its equivalent in terms of in- j 
terest.
The average credit cost of $1,943 is 3.99 percent of the aver­
age total annual sales of $48,731. Each dollar of sales would, j 
therefore, include an added burden of 3.99 cents.
If both cash and credit patrons paid the burden of 3.99 per­
cent, the cash patrons are penalized, but the credit patrons j 
receive credit for an average period of 5.4 months. Hence, they | 
bear a burden equal to 0.774 percent interest per month, or 9.29 
percent per year. But if credit patrons were to pay the entire 
credit cost themselves, they would pay a burden of 8.2 per­
cent for which they would receive an average of 5.4 months’ 
time. This burden represents a rate of 1.52 percent per month, 
or 18.24 percent per year.
All accounts, however, do not run the same length of time. 
A patron who pays his account in one month instead of the 
average time of 5.4 months, bears a burden equal to 4.18 per­
cent per month, or 50.2 percent per year. If he pays in 3 
months, his annual rate is 16.7 percent, and if he waits 6 
months he pays 8.36 percent. Accordingly, it is a wise patron 
who does not pay his account too promptly!
Credit Policy and Cost of Credit to Patrons
The credit policy, as well as the time accounts run, has con­
siderable influence on the average cost of credit to patrons.
 ^ Table XXXII shows that the annual rate is about twice as 
high for a patron doing business with a liberal credit company 
as for one trading with a strict credit company, the rate for 
liberal companies being considerably higher than the usual 
bank rate. The burden to credit patrons trading with liberal 
companies is especially heavy if they pay promptly. The bur­
den to cash patrons in such cases is incalculable.
It should also be noted that altho the credit cost in percent 
of total sales rises rapidly, the average time accounts run also 
increases, but not nearly so rapidly.










Interest rate equivalent of ci edit cost





run 2 months 
instead of 
average time 
per yearPer month Per year
Less than 15 1.8 3.1 0.58 6.96 10.8
15 to 29 3.7 4.8 0.77 9.24 22.2
30 and over 7.9 7.8 1.01 12.12 ■ 47.4
Average 4.18 5.4 0.774 ' 9.29 25.1
H  ■_—
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In this calculation, it is assumed that both cost and credit 
patrons pay the same prices, hence share credit costs equally. 
The number of months ’ sales represented by receivables, how­
ever, is calculated on the basis of the volume of credit sales 
and the receivables for each group.
The final answer to the question of what it costs patrons 
to receive credit on purchases depends further upon prevailing 
• practices regarding granting of cash discounts, charging of 
interest on accounts, price policy, and on other practices. These 
questions will be discussed next in connection with the general 
topic of prevailing credit practices and attempts to control the 
credit problem.
PART IV . CONTROLLING T H E  CREDIT PROBLEM  
P R E V A I L I N G  C R E D I T  P R A C T I C E S  
Credit Policies ,
In many cases it was difficult to discover the presence of a 
“ policy”  in the credit practice. Certainly too often the matter 
of extending credit has not been given sufficient attention by 
the management to enable it to formulate rules with reference 
to it.
Some impressions, however, as to prevailing practice can be 
obtained from replies received to questions regarding different 
phases of the credit practice.
Credit or Cash
Most companies are at least consciously following a general 
policy either of extending credit or attempting not to extend 
credit. Of a total of 114 companies, 93, or 82 percent, reported 
following a definite policy of extending credit, and the other 
21, or 18 percent, were definitely attempting not to extend 
credit. Of the 21 companies, 6 reported operating on a strictly 
cash basis and 15 on a “ modified”  cash basis. A detailed ex­
amination of a few cases reporting “ strict cash”  revealed that 
the rule had not in reality been strictly observed. Several com­
panies are known to have adopted restrictive policies since 
these figures were obtained. Hence, it is safe to assume that at 
least one-fifth of the companies are consciously attempting to 
limit credit extensions to the practical exclusion of credit sell­
ing. Many companies operating on a credit basis are, of course, 
also restricting credit extensions, mainly as to time, but also 
thru more or less careful selection of credit risks.
Credit Terms
Credit terms also vary greatly and are adminstered with 
varying degrees of flexibilities. The limit of time specified
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was frequently qualified by the statement, “ We try to get 
the money in — days.”  The intentions as to time limits are 
indicated by replies from 108 companies tabulated below : 
Time limit Number of times reported
15 days 1
30 days 38
30 to 60 days 4
60 days 11
60 to 90 days 4
90 days 7
6 months 2
No definite terms ■ 18
No report * 23
108
Thirty-nine of the one hundred eight companies are thus 
attempting to limit credit to 30 days or less. About the same 
number, however, reported no definite terms, those not report­
ing being included with this group. The limits specified are 
no doubt exceeded to some extent in most cases.
Even where granting credit is the general rule, exceptions 
are frequently made in the case of specific commodities. “ Coal 
is cash”  is a familiar slogan. Even tho not strictly adhered to, 
it indicates a tendency. Twine, seeds, grinding and grain re­
tailed also often fall into the cash group. Exactly two-thirds 
of the companies, however, reported that none of the commodi­
ties were handled on a cash basis.
Discounts for Cash Payment
According to table XXXIII, 75 percent of the companies al 
lowed no discount for cash payment. The others allowed dis­
counts ranging from 2 percent to over 10, it being 2 to 5 per­
cent for 21 of the 26 companies allowing*discounts.
TABLE X X X III . DISCOUNTS FOR CASH PAYM EN T ALLOW ED BY 
106 FARM ERS’ ELEVATORS




2 percent on coal ar.d feed 1
2 percent to 4 percent 1
2 percent to 5 percent 2
4 percent 2
5 percent 8
5 percent on feed 1
5 percent on lumber sales of $50 or more 1
5 percent on lumber 1
7 percent 1
10 percent 2
10 percent on lumber i
50c per ton on coal i
T otal 106
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Practically all the companies allowing discounts reported 
I good results and over four-fifths of those not allowing dis­
counts expressed an opinion favoring the practice.
The usual objection to allowing discounts is that because of 
competitive conditions prices quoted are usually net or cash 
j prices. Any discount for cash payment would, therefore, result 
in inadequate gross margins. One manager, however, secured 
excellent results by quoting times prices, the 5 percent dis­
count which he allowed for cash in three days then brought 
his net cash prices slightly below competitors * prices. In this 
case, 95 percent of sales were for cash, which high percentage 
the manager attributed to his discount policy.
Many managers object to quoting cash prices because diffi­
culty is experienced in collecting a time price, when, as fre- 
[ quently happens, the sale turns out to be a credit sale.
Interest on Accounts
The granting of a cash discount places a premium on cash 
payment and tends to eliminate the discrimination as between 
cash and credit patrons. Another method which has the same 
purpose in view is to charge interest on accounts which exceed 
a given time limit. Whereas, only 25 percent of the companies 
allowed discounts for cash, 42 percent attempted to charge 
interest on accounts. The usual rate was 8 percent and usually 
| this was charged after 30 or 60 days, but in some cases after 6 
months. The opinion of managers backed by experiences is that 
it is easier to “ deduct something than to add something.”  
Reports indicate that with some exceptions little interest on 
accounts is actually collected.
Forty-four percent of the companies reported converting 
accounts to notes, usually after 6 months or a year. Many of 
them, however, resort to this practice to only a limited extent, 
tlut of a hundred audits examined, however, 67 carried notes 
averaging $2,055 per company. Based on the total average of 
receivables, the notes constitute over 18 percent.
Over half the companies reported collecting 5 percent or less 
pt the notes at maturity, the chief reason being that frequently 
k is the slow pay or doubtful account which is converted to 
a note. Usually the note is found to be no easier to collect 
than the account, and a relatively large proportion of the notes 
are, in some cases, finally written off.
Selecting Credit Risks
Various methods of passing on requests for credit are fol­
lowed. Of 35 companies reporting, 9 used a local or county cred­
it bureau. Eighteen favored such a bureau, and only one using 
* reported unsatisfactory results. Fifteen companies consulted
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the bank, a few consulted lists from the county recorder’s of­
fice, a few consulted the board of directors, and others “ took 
a chance.”
The small part played by the board of directors with refer­
ence to the credit policy is indicated by the fact that in 20 out 
of 35 cases the board did not determine the credit policy, and 
in only 14 cases did the board examine a list of the accounts 
receivable and then usually only once or twice a year. In 5 
of the 35 companies the board examined the receivables every 
30 days.
Collection Methods
Methods of collection play an important part in keeping 
down receivables and losses from bad accounts. With the ex­
ception of a limited number of companies which have definite 
and strict terms and enforce them religiously, the prevailing 
method of collecting seems to be to “  get what you can whenever 
you can.”




Statements and personal calls 
No special method 
No answer







Replies indicating the use of more vigorous collection methods
are as follows:
“Go after them” 8
“All kind of methods” 5
“ Board members help collect” 4
Understanding as to payment at time of sale 10
Collection agencies used 7
34
Another analysis indicates that 44 percent of the amount 
collected was collected thru deductions from grain and live­
stock checks, 34 percent by personal collecting and 22 percent 
as a result of sending out statements.
The purpose of the statement is not merely to dun the patron, 
but to advise him as to the condition of his account. Many dis­
putes can thus be avoided and mistakes corrected. No doubt 
many collections made by deductions from grain checks are 
the direct result of the reminder in the form of a statement re­
ceived by the patron. , ' ;
The practice of sending statements of accounts to patrons is 
rather général. The summary from 115 schedules shows that 98 
sent statements, 4 did not and 13 did not answer. Only 46 per­
cent of the companies, however, sent statements monthly, 33 per-
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cent sent them every 60 days and the remaining 21 percent sent 
them at no regular times, some only once a year and some only 
to selected patrons.
About 64 percent of the companies  ^reported loss of business 
due to patrons hauling their grain elsewhere in order to avoid 
having their account collected out of the proceeds. One manager 
reported loss of 24 percent of these credit patrons, another re­
ported 10 percent. One-fourth of the companies reported that 
the patrons expecting their accounts to be deducted from grain 
checks drove a harder bargain in selling their grain.
Bringing suit in order to collect was reported in but few cases. 
Most boards and managers prefer to lose the amount due rather 
than sue, sometimes because the account is considered too small 
and again because they shrink from using force. Some of the 
managers most successful in collecting, however, feel convinced 
that bringing suit creates a wholesome moral attitude toward 
such obligations on the part of patrons, and that patrons sued 
more frequently than not subsequently become good pay 
patrons. Most of them agree, however, that lack of firmness re­
sults in abuse of the credit privilege.
The use of the services of outside collectors and collection 
agencies is very limited. Frequently only the accounts written 
off are turned over to collectors. The rates paid for such service 
range from 10 to 50 percent, the most common rate being 25 per­
cent. Unsatisfactory results were reported in a number of cases 
where collection agencies were used. Much depends on the selec­
tion of the agency.
Provision for Bad Debt Losses
Only 10.6 percent of the companies maintained a “ Reserve 
for Bad Debts”  account, and for some of these the reserve was 
so small in relation to the receivables carried that it is apparent 
that regular additions are not made to it annually.
The same reasons for maintaining a depreciation reserve hold 
good for maintaining a reserve for bad debts. Yet, whereas 84 
percent of the companies maintained the former reserve account, 
only 10.6 percent maintained the latter.
G R O W I N G  T E N D E N C Y  T O  C U R T A I L  C R E D I T
The number of companies which restrict credit is indicative of 
the attention already given to this problem. Figures already 
presented showed that 10 percent of the companies kept their 
receivables below 10 percent of sideline sales, and one-fourth of 
them kept the receivables below 15 percent of retail sales.
Altho a few companies adopted restrictive policies early in 
their history, by far most of them changed during or since 1926. 
Further evidence3 of interest in the subject is indicated by re-
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plies from 54 companies, 46 or 85 percent, of which recommend­
ed changes in their credit policy.
Changes Recommended
Of 46 companies recommending specific changes, 38 recom­
mended a change to a cash or ‘ ‘ approximately cash”  basis, two 
urged more careful selection of risks, and five recommended 
cash discounts and limited credit extensions. These figures, 
altho limited, indicate an overwhelming sentiment in favor of 
drastic restrictions. Five companies now on a “ modified”  cash 
basis, recommended a strictly cash policy, their experience 
with moderate restrictions being so favorable that they were 
encouraged to ‘ ‘ go all the way. ’ *
Factors Retarding Change
In the face of sentiment favoring restrictions of credit as just 
brought out, and in the face of financial disadvantage of liberal 
credit, one wonders why progress in restricting credit has been 
so tardy. This question was put to officers and managers at each 
of 33 meetings at which 264 companies were represented.
The replies most frequently received are:
1. It involves too radical a change.
2. Board of directors does not support the manager.
3. Community has credit * ‘  habit ’ ’ .
4. Farmers need credit; farmers’ companies should serve 
their patrons; credit restrictions would cause hardship.
5. Stockholders and directors are worst offenders and would 
not support restrictive policy.
6. Have not given matter any consideration.
7. Credit extension is a general policy in other lines of 
business.
8. Competitors would not make similar change and far­
mers ’ company would lose business.
9. Credit restrictions would offend “ good pay” , as well as 
“ slow pay”  but substantial and reliable patrons.
10- Lack of courage to face criticism of patrons, which it is 
anticipated would follow change.
This is not a complete list of objections raised, but it is for­
midable enough.
The significant reasons for slow progress in this direction 
may, it is believed, be reduced to a relatively small number:
1. A considerable number of managers and officers sin­
cerely believe that a business cannot be successfully conducted 
without extending credit—in other words, that restriction of 
credit would drive business away. Some of those holding this 
view, however, admit that it might be done if the competitors 
and other business men in the town adopted similar measures.
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2. Among those who admit that a change would be possible 
of accomplishment with beneficial results, many are held back 
because they believe changing to a restrictive policy is a diffi­
cult and revolutionary step and would arouse a storm of protest.
3. Lack of knowledge on the part of stockholders and di­
rectors of the situation regarding credit extended by the com­
pany, and more particularly a lack of appreciation of the disad­
vantages of extending credit or the advantages and possibilities 
of restricting credit is often a reason why action regarding the 
credit problem has not been considered. Moreover, business has 
been run on a liberal credit basis so long that it is frequently 
accepted as a necessary evil.
4. In a previous discussion it was shown that some credit 
patrons receive considerable credit service at much less than it 
costs the company to render it. Naturally, such patrons will want 
to continue to receive this advantage as long as they can and 
will protest when it is denied them. Such patrons may exert un­
due influence, especially if they happen to be substantial far­
mers in the community, and particularly so if they are also 
stockholders of the company.
Financial difficulties precipitated by the depression, the 
growing importance of sidelines with consequent mounting of 
receivables and bad debts, combined with evidences on every 
hand of the success of cash stores, is arousing the alert and for­
ward-looking managers and officers of farmers’ elevators to 
view the situation with grave concern and to demand that some­
thing be done. The experience of those who have solved the prob­
lem should, therefore, be scrutinized by those seeking to solve a 
similar problem and advantage taken of any guidance it affords.
E X P E R I E N C E  O F  C O M P A N I E S  R E G A R D I N G  C R E D I T  
R E S T R I C T I O N S
The experiences of 30 companies which are operating under 
restrictive credit policies were studied in considerable detail. 
Briefly summarized, this experience, rather than substantiating 
the fears expressed and objections raised, practically without 
exceptions contradicts them. In only one case were the results 
reported as unsatisfactory and this was due to the method em­
ployed rather than to the policy adopted.
The experience demonstrates, first, that a farmers’ elevator 
business can be operated successfully on a restricted credit basis. 
Two companies had been operating on practically a cash basis 
for nine 'years, one for seven years, several for six years and 
the others for shorter periods of time. Two companies reported 
that they had always operated on a strictly cash basis.
Does Restricting Credit Decrease Volume of Business?
The fear most frequently voiced is that curtailing credit ex­
tensions would drive away business. Twenty-eight companies,
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data regarding whose business were available for the year pre­
ceding as well as for the year following the change, showed an 
increase in volume of over 15 percent. The increase for those 
companies which adopted strict terms was 15.5 percent, and for 
those adopting moderately strict policies the average increase 
was 15.2 percent. In one case the .sideline volume increased 48 
percent over a four-year period. In another case, a 30-day credit 
limit was adopted in 1925, changed in 1926 to a 10-day limit. 
The sideline business increased from $16,000 in 1926 to $44,000 
in 1928; volume of coal sales increased as follows: 1926, 651 
tons; 1927, 713 tons; 1928, 1,436 tons. In the third case, sideline 
volume increased 67 percent and the grain volume in bushels in­
creased 84 percent. The largest increase in sideline sales re­
ported following a change to a cash policy was 175 percent.
Several companies reported a temporary drop in volume im­
mediately following the change, and some of the companies stud­
ied were in this phase of the transition at the time surveyed. In 
one case, two years elapsed before the volume came back, but in 
most cases the patrons had fully adjusted themselves to the 
change within six months. In other cases, no reduction at all in 
volume occurred. In a few cases where the companies had among 
their coal patrons a large number of city wage earners, the re­
strictive policy resulted in some permanent reduction in volume 
of coal sales. Usually, however, a large part of this loss was con­
sidered an advantage rather than a disadvantage, because a pro­
lific source of bad debts was thereby eliminated.
The above comparisons afe based on the experiences of a lim­
ited number of companies, but they have the merit that in each 
case the comparison was made of volume before and after the 
change in credit policy, other factors being thus to a large ex­
tent held constant. Comparing the volume of business, however, 
of , companies which restrict credit with the volume, of companies 
which do not, also tends to strengthen the case for restriction. 
Such a comparison based on 93 companies has already been pre­
sented. For convenience, the results are repeated here :
Had sidelines sales
Companies whose receivables were: amounting to:
Less than 15 percent of annual sideline
sales (22 companies) < $63,800
15 percent to 29 percent (39 companies) 49,200
30 percent or over (32 companies) 37,800
Less than 10 percent (9 companies) 64,333
40 percent and over (15 companies) 26,133
It appears, .thus, that large volume, on the average, is asso­
ciated with strict terms and small volume with liberal terms. 
Altho this does not prove that the strict policy is the cause of 
large volume, a number of reasons have been advanced by man­
agers and officers why volume of business should increase as a 
direct result of making the credit policy more stringent.
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One reason is that reductions in prices made possible by lower 
costs are noted and acted upon promtly by the rural trade. Man­
agers report that farmers who are able to pay cash prefer to 
take their busines where a premium is placed on cash payment. 
Moreover, they realize that when trading with a dealer who 
grants credit liberally, they are helping to pay the bills of those 
who did not pay.
Another reason advanced is that where the terms are strict, 
patrons feel that they are not being discriminated against in the 
credit granted.
Another more important reason is that frequently credit pat­
rons instinctively avoid a dealer to whom they owe money. Out 
of 103 replies received regarding this point, 81 were to the effect 
that some business was lost for this reason. One manager who 
has been particularly studious of the credit problem, reported 
that he lost the business of 24 percent of the patrons with whom 
accounts had been opened. Conversely, numerous cases were 
cited by him and other managers of credit patrons, who after 
having thus discontinued business relations, resumed them 
after their accounts had been paid, sometimes even tho court 
action had been resorted to in order to force settlement.
This practice affects the grain volume as well as the sideline 
volume. Sixty-four percent of the companies reported that 
credit patrons, and even directors, hauled their grain elsewhere 
rather than to the farmers’ elevators, ostensibly because they 
feared being dunned. In one case the volume of grain business 
increased 84 percent following the adoption of a restrictive 
credit policy.
Experience in Retail Trade
It thus appears that experience does not bear out the conten­
tion that restricting credit will drive business away. These con­
clusions are also substantiated by a Cornell study4 based on 43 
feed stores, in which it was found that the higher the percentage 
credit sales were of total sales, the smaller the volume of sales. 
The figures follow:
Where credit sales were: Volume of sales were:
50 percent or less of total sales $72,257
50.1 percent to 70 percent 57,398
More than 70 percent 39,199
In the case of retail stores catering largely if not exclusively 
to city trade, large volumes tend to be associated with relatively 
large proportions of credit sales. The figures based on a study 
of 451 retail grocery stores in Louisville, Kentucky, made by 
the United States Department of Commerce, are as follows :5
4 An Economic Study of Rural Store Credit in New York, by Leland Spencer, Bul­
letin No. 430, Agricultural Experiment Station, Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.
'Credit Extension and Business Failures, by Wilbur C. Plummer, Trade Infor­
mation Bulletin Number 627, Bureau o f Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Depart­
ment of Commerce, Washington, D. C.
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Stores having total sales of: 
Less than $5,000













The above results are substantiated by the Nortwestern Uni­
versity Bureau of Business Research6 and the Harvard Univer­
sity Bureau of Business Research.7
None of the figures cited, however, are entirely comparable 
with those presented in this study, for they show the relation­
ship between the extent of credit selling and volume, whereas 
the purpose here is to show the relationship between strictness 
of credit policy and volume of sales.
That the larger stores follow a more strict policy in the sense 
above indicated is evidenced by figures presented in the Depart­
ment of Comfiierce study which show that large stores use 
credit bureaus more freely than small stores and that their 
losses from bad debts are only 0.3 percent of total sales, com­
pared to 5.6 percent for the smallest stores. Hence, it. appears 
that even in city stores, large volume tends to be associated 
with a strict credit policy.
Another factor deterring "managers and directors from taking 
action to curtail credit which has been advanced frequently, is 
the belief that many difficulties and much resistance and criti­
cism will be encountered.
In the majority of cases, the coiltrary was found to be true. 
Managers and officers themselves were in most cases surprised 
at the extent of the immediate and favorable reaction; com­
mendation rather than criticism was often received.
A summary of the advantages of restricting credit gleaned 
from case studies and discussions at county meetings of farmers’ 
elevator managers and officials follows:
S U M M A R Y  O F  A D V A N T A G E S  O F  C U R T A I L E D  C R E D I T  R E P O R T E D  
B Y  M A N A G E R S  A N D  O F F I C E R S
1] Reduces amount of receivables carried.
2. Reduces amount of borrowed money.
3. Reduces operating expenses.
4. Decreases difficulties of financing new equipment and 
new business.
6Costs, Merchandising Practices, Advertising, and Sales in the Retail Distribution 
of Clothing. Northwestern Univ,. 'School of Commerce Bureau of Business Research, 
Volume 1, 1921, page 67. ;
7Operating Expenses in Retail Grocery Stores in 1922. Harvard University 
Bureau .of Business Research, Bulletin 35, 1923, Page 65.
Difficulties in Changing Credit Terms
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5. Makes possible buying supplies in earlots at more favor­
able prices.
6. Releases capital for financing expansion of business.
7. Makes possible taking discounts on purchases of supplies.
8. Reduces losses from bad debts.
9. Eliminates disputes with patrons over accounts.
10. Reduces the amount of office labor.
11. Reduces margins, hence makes possible price reductions 
and increases volume of business.
12. Makes possible laying in stocks of supplies in anticipa­
tion of seasonal rises in prices.
13. Provides more working capital which results in better 
and more profitable handling of the business.
14. Improves loyalty of patrons and members.
15. Eliminates discrimination between cash and credit pa­
trons.
16. Eliminates necessity of directors signing notes for bor­
rowing money.
17. Credit rating of company at bank was improved.
18. Improves possibility of meeting competition.
It must be appreciated that most of these companies have not 
yet experienced the full effects of the change in credit policy. 
In some cases, large amounts of receivables must yet be collected 
and uncollectable accounts written off. Some further impair­
ment of their financial condition will follow as a result. Reduc­
tions of indebtedness must wait upon the collection of receiva­
bles and upon future earnings. Until then, relief cannot be ob­
tained from excessive interest and bad debt burdens, excessive 
expenses and wide margins. Further benefits may be expected 
when the results of the change commence to emerge in terms of 
added financial benefits to members and patrons. None of the 
companies interviewed favored returning to the old policy, and 
several of them were considering further restrictions.
C R E D I T  S E R V I C E  A N D  C O O P E R A T I V E  P R I N C I P L E S
t
Expressions are often heard to the effect that it is the duty 
of a farmers’ organization to serve the farmers, and that credit 
is urgently needed by farmers.
It cannot, of course, be denied that credit is needed in farm­
ing; nor can'it be denied that the provision of credit service 
is a legitimate cooperative activity.
There are important reasons, however, why rendering credit 
service ifi the manner in which it is ordinarily done by farmers ’ 
elevators, cannot logically nor economically be combined on an 
extensive scale with marketing and purchasing services.
1. Many farmers’ elevators are not equipped to pass on 
credit risks. Even local bankers have their troubles in this re-
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spect. Large mercantile establishments maintain credit and col­
lection departments manned with a staff of specialists who make 
this work their special business.
2. The personal qualities of a successful farmers’ elevators 
manager include, among others, those of a successful salesman. 
The personality of a successful credit man or collector is quite 
different. Most managers are better salesmen than collectors.
3. Few farmers’ elevators are able to keep their receiv­
ables liquid; they are not in a form to be rediscounted, nor even 
to be used as collateral security without much bother and cost.
4. Many companies do not have enough capital to provide 
an extensive credit service, without resorting to the personal 
security of their officers.
5. - One of the essentials of successful cooperation is that 
the members have a common interest.
The chief interest of Iowa farmers in cooperative marketing 
and purchasing organizations is to provide themselves with the 
best possible' buying and selling service at the lowest possible 
cost. It is apparent from the analyses in this bulletin that liber­
al extension of credit is inconsistent with economy in buying 
and selling.
Moreover, not all farmers need nor want the credit service, 
and still fewer would want it if they had to bear the entire cost 
of providing it. To the extent to which they do not bear the cost, 
they are induced to use such credit to the maximum. Non-mem­
bers usually receive much of the credit service, but do not share 
the risks and responsibilities of maintaining the organization.
Thus in the course of time, a conflict of interest develops be­
tween members who desire credit service, and members who de­
sire economical buying and selling service. Moreover, members 
may feel that non-members are receiving a disproportionate 
amount of service at the expense of the members.
When a cooperative organization permits such divergent in­
terests to invade the organization, it to that extent loses its co­
operative character and invites serious difficulties in the form 
of disloyalty and lack of interest.
S U G G E S T I O N S  F O R  P R O C E D U R E
As would be expected, the benefits reported by some compan­
ies which have adopted restrictive credit policies, were greater 
than those reported by others. Local conditions vary tremen­
dously. Some of the specific factors in. the local situation which 
may have a bearing on the amount of benefit received as a re­
sult of credit restrictions are: The character of the business, 
commodities handled, etc.; the character of the people and their 
prosperity and habits; the business judgment of managers and 
officers; the financial strength of the organization; the type of
50
Bulletin, Vol. 24 [1930], No. 283, Art. 1
http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/bulletin/vol24/iss283/1
farming which may affect the regularity of farm income; the 
attitude of merchants and competitors; cooperative spirit among 
the farmers; the previous favorable or unfavorable history of 
the company and its management. Others could be mentioned.
In studying the cases referred to, an effort was made to dis­
cover whether or not peculiar circumstances were present favor­
ing operating on a restricted credit basis, and to whether or not 
any mistakes had been made. No ‘ ‘ happy combination of cir­
cumstances”  favoring the change was found in any one case.
Study Local Situation
One of the first essentials for success in restricting credit is 
that the board of directors and the manager be first thoroly con­
vinced of two things: 1. That excessive credit in the particular 
case is bad business: and 2. That its elimination or severe re­
striction would be highly beneficial. Altho the results of this 
study lead to the conclusion that, in general, severe restrictions 
of credit would be beneficial, the management in a given case 
needs to arrive at conclusions independently and in the light of 
local conditions. Otherwise the new policy will not be backed 
with the necessary courage and determination, and the explan­
ations advanced to patrons will not carry conviction and en­
thusiasm to them. Divided opinion among board members and 
manager is one of the most important factors tending to de­
feat efforts to curtail credit.
Educational Work
In a few cases, complaints arose due to the fact that patrons 
were not informed as to the reasons for making the change. 
Mimeographed letters, newspaper publicity and other means 
have been successfully employed in explaining to patrons and 
stockholders the advantages of the change to them in terms of 
improved service, lower costs and prices, safeguarded stock­
holders’ investment and other advantages which will appeal to 
their good business judgement and sense of fairness.
The educational efforts should, however, not be limited to 
members and patrons. Much benefit is to be derived from the 
cooperation and the moral support of the merchants and banks. 
In several cases, competitors as well as other merchants have co­
operated to the extent of adopting similar measures.
Notice of Change
Action taken without adequate notice being given will be re­
sented and will fail to enlist the necessary cooperation. In some 
cases, even two weeks’ notice has resulted in little or no com­
plaint, but in most cases a month will be none too much.
Drastic Action
How drastic the restrictions in the credit policy should be will 
depend on local conditions. That the restrictions can be too
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drastic is proven, by experience. In one case, a wide-open policy 
was suddenly changed to a strictly cash policy, with the result 
that it had to be abandoned in a short time and a less stringent 
policy adopted. This company is now working toward a cash 
policy and is meeting with little resistance.
On the other hand, little if any difficulty was encountered 
when moderate restrictions were adopted at first, and these sub­
sequently made more and more stringent. This has been the pro­
cedure in a large majority of cases, altho exceptions may be 
cited where a strict policy was adopted at the outset without 
serious difficulties.
“S T R I C T L Y  C A S H "  VS. “C O N T R O L L E D  C R E D I T ”
Should the end toward which to work be a strictly cash policy, 
or a rigorously controlled credit policy l
Strictly Cash
Those who favor the strictly cash policy insist that if any 
credit is granted there can be no effective control without dis­
crimination. On the other hand, those who favor a controlled 
credit policy interpret “  Strictly cash”  as meaning that abso­
lutely no deviations under any circumstances shall be made, 
which they hold is not workable.
Experience tends to support the point of view that absolutely 
strict cash is an ideal difficult to attain. Some deviations were 
found to have actually been made in every case studied.
To be sure, in most such cases, the exceptions were negligible, 
and the accounts were collectible on demand. They usually rep­
resented .cases where patrons were “ caught without cash”  at 
the moment of the purchase because of unavoidable circum­
stances,—cases in which insistanee on upholding f ‘ the letter ot 
the law”  rather than the spirit, would have meant inconvenienc­
ing the patrons needlessly and arbitrarily. Failure to settle as 
promised would in such cases deprive the patron of similar 
privileges in the future.
The writer takes the position that even a strictly cash policy 
needs to be administered with judgment, and that under the 
circumstances under which farmers must transact business, de­
viations of the kind indicating may be necessary and justified, 
and may be made without sacrificing any of the advantages oi 
a strictly cash policy. That a strictly cash policy, interpreted m 
this way, is a feasible end toward which to work is borne out 
by the experience of farmers’ elevators.
On the other hand, recognition of the fact that farmers cannot 
always have the purchase price in their pockets, has led a few 
companies to regard cash in three, five or ten days, as cash p&y" 
ment, such privileges being granted only when necessary and 
only to patrons of proven integrity. One company has been oper-
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ating under this plan with excellent results since 1926. Inciden­
tally, the volume of sideline sales of this company increased 2.7 
times within two years.
Controlled Credit
The alternatives thus appear to be either a cash plan as de­
fined above, or a credit plan providing for adequate control. 
Frequently, control is interpreted to mean merely restricting 
the time. Unless accompanied by strict selection of risks, rigor­
ous collections and inducements to pay cash, merely limiting the 
time will largely be futile.
The purpose of a credit control plan is to reduce the amount 
of receivables carried, to reduce the losses from bad debts and 
to limit credit extensions to an accommodation basis, rather than 
to make it one of the. alternative sources from which farmers 
may obtain capital for financing farm operations. Loaning mon­
ey is a highly specialized business and can be carried on econo­
mically only by financial institutions which have proper facili­
ties for the purpose.
E S S E N T I A L S  O F  A  C R E D I T  C O N T R O L  P L A N
Credit as a Privilege
Hence, the first essential of a credit control plan is that the 
company should reserve the right to refuse to p ’ant credit ex­
cept under given satisfactory conditions. Credit thus granted 
becomes a privilege which may be withdrawn if the conditions 
are not satisfied.
Inducement to Pay Cash
In order that the receivables shall be reduced, some induce­
ment to pay cash must be provided, or most patrons would con­
tinue to permit their accounts to run full time allowed. The mat­
ter of discounts for cash has been discussed on page 296.
Eliminate Discrimination •
Another essential is that the patrons using the credit service 
shall bear the cost of carrying the accounts, thus avoiding dis­
crimination between cash and credit patrons. If prices quoted 
are time prices, this will be taken care of automatically thru 
granting discounts for cash. In order to avoid legal objections 
to adding interest to overdue accounts, one company issues a 
special form of interest-bearing note to cover all sales other than 
strictly cash sales. If the account is paid within the discount 
period, the interest is waived and a discount allowed. Otherwise, 
the note automatically continues in force. Where such notes are 
not used, prompt payment should be made one of the conditions 
under which further credit will be extended.
Credit Must Be Merited
The patrons to whom credit is extended should assume the 
burden of maintaining their credit standing. As it is contem-
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plated that statements would be sent monthly, accounts may be 
made payable on a given day of the month following the 
purchase. Violations should then automatically deprive such 
patrons of further credit privileges, unless arrangements satis­
factory to the management for an extension of time are made.
Time Limited
A time limit would, of course, be an important essential 
of any control plan. "What this limit should be will depend on 
local conditions. A 10 to 30-day limit is suggested. If it is much 
longer than this, receivables and bad debts will likely not be re­
duced appreciably and the credit transaction is likely to become ■ 
a loan rather than a ‘ ‘ convenience ’ * to the patron.
Lumber and Machinery
Experience has shown that is is difficult to enforce cash or 
short term limits in the case of sales of lumber and machinery. 
Moreover, reasons for doing so are less urgent as credit for lum­
ber used in buildings can be secured by mechanic’s liens and 
machinery by chattel mortgage. In any case, insisting on bank­
able notes would help maintain the receivables from such sources 
in more liquid form. Small items of lumber or parts for ma­
chinery should, however, be subject to the same credit restric­
tions as ordinary retail sales.
The foregoing essentials are incorporated in two suggestive 
plans presented at the end of this bulletin.
B E S T  T I M E  T O  C H A N G E  C R E D I T  P O L I C Y
Altho the best time to break away from a loose credit policy 
is immediately, experience indicates that doing so at the time 
of a change of managers may cause somewhat less disturbances, 
as patrons and members usually look for some changes in policy 
to occur at that time. Also managers who have followed a liberal 
policy in the past may experience more difficulty than a new 
manager in enforcing a restrictive policy.
In areas where the farm income is highly seasonal, some ad­
vantage may be gained by making the change at or preceding 
harvest time. ;
Altho in some cases, a restrictive policy may have been adopt­
ed because the company was in financial difficulty, there is no 
merit in waiting until such difficulties rise.
Should a company wait until competitors and farmers ’ ele­
vators at competing point take similar action? Undoubtedly, the 
fact that other companies have adopted a similar policy would 
aid a given company in justifying taking such action. On the 
other hand, as far as the fear of losing business is concerned, 
there seems to be little merit in postponing action-. The compan­
ies which have already adopted restrictive polices are widely 
scattered, which suggests that individual action is feasible.
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C O L L E C T I N G  E X I S T I N G  A C C O U N T S
A question will arise as to whether the accounts already on 
the books should be collected before putting the restrictive poli­
cy into effect. To do this would in most cases mean that action 
would be unduly delayed. Altho the new policy should apply 
only to new business, some time limit should be placed on the 
collection of existing accounts and further credit denied to 
patrons who fail to pay within the time limit, unless satisfactory 
arrangements are made by the patrons.
F E A R L E S S  E N F O R C E M E N T
The necessity of fearlessly enforcing any restrictive policy 
adopted is stressed last for the sake of emphasis. Complaint 
from but a few farmers has been known to influence a wavering 
minority of the board of directors to such an extent that the 
manager failed to receive the united support of the board. Any 
tendency for volume to drop is especially likely to be viewed 
with undue alarm. Making concessions at this point is almost 
certain to invite difficulties, if not complete failure of the policy.
That the management should be convinced of the desirability 
of making the change before adopting the restrictive policy 
has already been stressed. And if reasons for making the change 
are convincingly explained to the community, little if any loss 
of desirable business should occur, except possibly during a 
short period of readjustment. Even a year or two may be too 
short a time in which to demonstrate whether or not the change 
has been desirable. In any event, the analyses-presented in this 
bulletin show that a considerable portion of the credit business 
could be sacrificed without decreasing the total net profits.
Lax methods in the enforcement of the details of the plan 
serve as an entering wedge for dissension. Favoring an official 
of the company or an influential patron, intentionally or unin­
tentionally; granting discounts for cash after the discount 
period has elapsed; failing to call attention to past-due ac­
counts or disqualifying a patron for further credit when the 
circumstances warrant doing so; and other concessions that 
might be mentioned are forms of discrimination and evidences 
of weakness which patrons are quick to notice.
In thus stressing the necessity of strict enforcement, it is, of 
course, contemplated that judgment and diplomacy will be used. 
Due consideration should be given to extenuating circum­
stances. But firmness in dealing with deliberate evasions and 
infractions will inspire respect for and confidence in the man­
agement.
T A K I N G  O F F I C I A L  A C T I O N
It is desirable that any important change in business policy 
be made thru formal action of the board of directors on a motion 
or resolution embodying the desired changes. The resolution
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should state the conditions clearly and definitely in order to 
avoid subsequent differences of opinion as to the intentions and 
should be recorded in the minutes of the meeting. A copy of 
the resolution should be displayed in the manager’s office.
SUGGESTIVE CREDIT CONTROL PLANS
Two plans for credit control are suggested herewith. One is 
a 10-day cash plan and the other a 30-day plan. Either of these 
may be modified as to details in accordance with local conditions, 
but any important deviations from the essentials already stress­
ed are likely to weaken rather than strengthen the plan.
CREDIT CONTROL PLAN NO. I 
10-Day Cash Basis
1. The policy shall be that cash payment is expected at time of 
purchase.
2. Under arrangements satisfactory to the board of directors, 10- 
days’ accommodation credit may be extended to prompt-pay 
patrons.
3. Credit privilege shall be denied patrons exceeding a time limit 
of 15 days.
4. Such patrons may be restored to good credit standing only by 
a vote of the board of directors.
5. A full list of all accounts and the time they have run shall be 
presented to the board at the end of each month.
6. On building jobs and lumber bills in excess of $------------  where
protected by mechanic’s lien, or machinery bills covered by chat­
tel mortgage, a time limit of six months shall apply, covered by 
bankable note bearing interest at a rate equal to the discount 
rate at the bank.
Exceptions to this section may be made only on approval of the 
board of directors.
CREDIT CONTROL PLAN NO. II 
30-Day Cash Basis
1. The policy shall be that cash payment is expected at time of 
purchase.
2. Under arrangements satisfactory to the board of directors, 30 
days’ accommodation credit may be extended to prompt-pay 
patrons.
3. Prices quoted and billed shall be gross prices subject to a dis­
count of 4% for spot cash, or 2% for cash in three days.
4. The credit privilege shall be denied patrons exceeding a time 
limit of 45 days.
5. Such patrons may be restored to good credit standing only by a 
vote of the board of directors.
5. A full list of all accounts and the time they have run shall be 
presented to the board at the end of each month.
7. On building jobs and lumber bills in excess of $------------  where
protected by mechanic’s lien, or machinery bills covered by chat­
tel mortgage, a time limit of six months shall apply, covered by 
a bankable note bearing interest at a rate equal to the discount 
rate at the bank. Exceptions to this section may be made only 
on approval of the board of directors.
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